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Abstract 
 
Within the field of cognitive psychology there are two opposing theoretical frameworks, the 
conceptual metaphor theory and the broaden-and-build theory, which attempt to explain the 
influence of emotionally valenced stimuli on attention distribution. The conceptual metaphor 
theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) asserts that concrete concepts (e.g. vertical distance or 
brightness) are used as metaphors to scaffold mental representations of abstract concepts (e.g. 
love and power). These metaphors rely on sensorimotor information in order to be 
understood, and therefore are said to be embodied. The focus of this thesis is the “Good is 
Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor. A central prediction of this theory is that 
emotionally valenced stimuli should activate the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” metaphor, and 
automatically shift vertical attention congruently. In contrast, the broaden-and-build theory 
(Fredrickson, 2004) is based on evolutionary principles (Frijda, 1986), with negative 
emotions associated with specific-action tendencies and positive emotions associated with 
diffuse-action tendencies. The main prediction derived from this theory is that when 
individuals are induced into positive emotions their attention is broadened, whereas when 
induced into negative emotions their attention is narrowed. The central aim of this thesis was 
to gather experimental data in support for either the conceptual metaphor theory or the 
broaden-and-build theory when using emotionally laden images to induce affect, compared to 
prior research, which has utilised valenced words. 
 This thesis also aimed to examine the influence, if any, of both valence and arousal of 
the emotional images. The literature provides conflicting views on whether these constructs 
are orthogonal or interconnected, and as such what effect they have on evaluative processing. 
To date, research examining the conceptual metaphor theory or the broaden-and-build theory 
has not controlled for both valence and arousal in their experimental design.  
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Two experiments were designed to assess both aims. In Experiment 1, emotionally valenced 
images were presented in either the upper or lower visual field, and participants were asked to 
categorise the image as “positive” or “negative” by pressing a designated key on a keyboard. 
In Experiment 2, the emotional images were displayed in the centre of the visual field for a 
fixed period of time, followed by the presentation of a target letter in either the upper or 
lower visual field. Participants responded by pressing the corresponding key to the target 
letter on a keyboard. Across both experiments no shifts in attention were congruent with the 
“Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor theory, indicating that the conceptual 
metaphor theory is not supported when utilising images. In contrast, Experiment 2 provided 
experimental data in support of the broaden-and-build theory, with participants responding 
faster to all target letters following high valenced images regardless of their position. Finally, 
this thesis provides support to the notion that valence and arousal are orthogonal constructs, 
independently influencing higher order cognitive processes such as attention.
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“How do people think?” is a question that has intrigued cognitive psychologists for decades, 
and has consequently led to a vast and in-depth corpus of research. Currently, there are two 
prominent theoretical viewpoints in this research domain, the “traditional view” and “the 
grounded cognition view”. Traditional theories of cognition assume that knowledge is held in 
semantic memory systems, which are isolated from the brains alternate modal systems; such 
as perception, action and introspection (Barsalou & Hale, 1993; Rumelhart, 1988; Smith, 
1981). Conversely, the theory of grounded cognition takes an amodal systems approach, 
concluding that the brains evolutionary systems collaborate to produce cognition (Barsalou, 
2008; Gibbs, 2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004; Wilson, 2002). 
Grounded cognition theorists commonly refer to the idea that cognition relies on the 
activation of the sensorimotor system, hence concurring that cognition is embodied (Pecher, 
Boot, & Van Dantzig, 2011). The cognitive viewpoint relevant to this thesis is that of 
grounded cognition. 
Grounded Cognition 
 The defining characteristic of grounded cognition is its core focus on mental 
simulation in the production of cognition (Decety & Grezes, 2006). Simulation is the “re-
enactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during experience with the 
world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 618). For example, when an individual thinks 
about an object, neurally stored patterns that have been encoded upon real experiences with 
the object are reactivated. Barsalou (1999) comments that this can include visual, auditory, 
tactile, olfactory and gustatory information, allowing the individual to feel as if they are 
actually perceiving the object upon re-activation. 
 Barsalou’s (1999) Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) theory is widely acknowledged 
as advancing the understanding of how grounded cognition works, and subsequently how 
mental simulation is utilised (Pezzulo & Calvi, 2011). According to the PSS theory, the brain 
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records sensorimotor information from a perceptual experience as a perceptual symbol, which 
is a schematic representation of selectively chosen features. As stated earlier, these features 
can include the five sensory modalities, and also proprioception and introspection (Barsalou, 
Solomon & Wu, 1999). The brain then stores these symbols in a perceptual simulator, which 
is a set of perceptual symbols that represent one particular concept. Therefore a simulator is 
not a re-enactment of a specific experience, but rather a network of information subsets that 
have been captured during discrete experiences. As perceptual symbols can be dynamically 
combined to create a simulation, concepts are considered to be specific instances of a 
category. For instance, an individual may represent a car by simulating seeing a car, driving a 
car or being a passenger in a car. This dynamic ability to combine components from different 
perceptual symbols, and thus create unique concepts, consequently means these mental 
simulations are equivalent to actual perception and action (Pecher et al., 2011).  Furthermore, 
Barsalou (1999) highlights that mental symbols and simulations form a fully functional 
conceptual system, which is interlinked with higher cognitive processes. This connection 
enables simulation activation to influence processes such as attention, memory and language 
processing. This thesis will focus on the effect that an individual’s PSS, and more broadly 
grounded cognition, has on attention. 
Evidence for the Grounded cognition view: Concrete concepts and vertical attention 
 The PSS theory explicitly noted that words could also produce mental simulators, 
which can in turn become entwined with the object simulator for which the word denotes. 
Barsalou (1999) noted that when an individual sights a word, activation of a word simulation 
has the ability to activate and control the correlated object’s simulations. In light of this 
connection, researchers have developed tasks to investigate the influence of grounded 
cognition on vertical attention, by exploring the relationship between concrete-word 
meanings and spatial location. 
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    Steic and Dojiman’s (2007) investigated this relationship by presenting undergraduate 
psychology students with words denoting flying and non-flying animals, which were presented in 
either the upper or lower portion of a computer screen. The flying animal words (e.g. stork and 
honeybee) were pre assessed by a separate group of undergraduate students as being spatially 
‘upwards’ oriented, and the non-flying animal words (e.g. rabbit and mole) as spatially 
‘downwards’ oriented. Participants were required to indicate on a keyboard whether the exhibited 
word represented a flying or non-flying animal. Results showed that participants judged words 
denoting flying animals faster when they were displayed in the upper section of the screen and 
non-flying animal words when they were presented at the bottom of the screen. 
 Similarly, Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) validated this significant interaction by presenting 
undergraduate students with semantically linked words pairs, which had a vertical canonical 
spatial relationship (e.g. attic and basement). The word pairs were presented on a computer 
screen in either their canonical (attic presented above basement) or non-canonical (basement 
presented above attic) order. Filler pairs that were semantically but not canonically linked (e.g. 
apple and pear) and unrelated pairs (e.g. car and tree) were also presented. Participants were 
asked to assess whether the words were related or unrelated, and reaction times for the 
experimental pairs were analysed. The results found that when word pairs were presented in 
canonical order the participant’s semantic-relatedness judgments were significantly faster than 
when the word pairs were not in canonical order.  
If the PSS theory is applied to Steic and Dojiman’s (2007) study, the presentation of an 
object word (e.g. honeybee), activated the appropriate perceptual simulation of that object. This 
simulation would have included spatial location information, such as honeybees being found up 
in the sky, subsequently causing a shift in the participant’s attention upwards (due to the 
connections between higher cognitive functions). If the word honeybee was presented at the top 
of the screen, the registered word’s position is congruent with the learned behavioural position of 
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the honeybee, thus allowing for a faster categorisation judgment. Correspondingly, the words 
presented in Zwann and Yaxley’s (2003) experiment would have both activated their appropriate 
perceptual simulations, therefore highlighting learnt spatial location information. Hence, when 
the registered words were canonically congruent with their neurally stored information on spatial 
location, categorisation judgments could be processed faster. Both of these studies therefore 
highlight the significant relationship between grounded cognition and spatial attention for 
concrete concepts.   
Grounded cognition and abstract concepts: The conceptual metaphor theory 
Whilst grounded cognition appears to eloquently explain how concrete concepts are 
represented in the brain, it is harder to imagine how this embodied grounded cognition works for 
abstract concepts, such as power and love, which have no tangible sensorimotor properties. A 
conglomerate of theories have proposed how grounded cognition represents abstract concepts, 
including utilizing situational information (Barsalou & Weimer-Hastings, 2005), internal affect 
(Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009) and linguistic information (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, 
Andrews, & Del Campo, 2011). An alternate view, the conceptual metaphor theory, suggests that 
abstract concepts are grounded in the sensorimotor system via the use of lexical metaphors, 
which is otherwise known as metaphorical mapping (Quadflieg et al., 2011).  
The Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) was developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 
1999) and is said to be strongly based on the scientific principles of philosophy and linguistics 
(Meier & Robinson, 2005). As noted above, the fundamental principle of the CMT is 
metaphorical mapping, or that concrete concepts (source domains/ ‘vehicles’) are used as 
metaphors to represent abstract concepts (target domains/ ‘the topic’). In other words, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980, 1999) state that a concrete vehicle is needed to scaffold a mental representation of 
an abstract topic, and that the mental representation of the vehicle is needed in order for an 
individual to fully understand the topic.  The source domain is a sensorimotor experience, such as 
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distance, vertical position, temperature or brightness. The target domain is an abstract concept, 
such as intimacy, power, health or affect. As these metaphors rely on sensorimotor information 
and its relation to the physical world in order to be understood, they are thus said to be embodied 
(Crawford, 2009). 
 A myriad of conceptual metaphors appear to be used in everyday language, across many 
spoken languages, to discuss the concept of affect (Gibbs, 2006). For example, “affection is 
warmth”, “intimacy is closeness” and “good is up and bad is down”. If analysed from a 
developmental viewpoint, these conceptual metaphors appear logical. Children learn that 
‘affection is warmth’ from the heat received during intimate hugs with parents, that ‘intimacy is 
closeness’ from the distal proximity perceived between the child and parent, and that ‘good is up’ 
from the attention, love and nutrients they receive from parents that appears above them 
(Crawford, 2009). As these connections between source and target domains develop early during 
childhood, cognitive theorists propose that these neural links are consistently strengthened, and 
lead to the unconscious use of conceptual metaphors (Godfrey & Grimshaw, 2012; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999) 
Evidence for the Conceptual Metaphor Theory: Good is up/Bad is down 
Meier and Robinson (2005) proposed a set of hypotheses which they believed, if proven, 
would determine whether conceptual metaphors are used to underlie representations of abstract 
concepts. Whilst these hypotheses have been tested on conceptual metaphors regarding power 
(Schubert, 2005) and religion (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007), this thesis 
will focus on metaphors associated with emotion-linked concepts. More specifically, whilst 
research has been conducted on emotionally-linked metaphors associated with brightness ( Meier, 
Robinson, Crawford, & Ahlvers, 2007), distance (Neumann & Strack, 2000) and dominance 
(Robinson, Zabelina, Ode, & Moeller, 2008), this thesis will focus on experiments that have 
directly tests the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” metaphor. 
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Meier and Robinson’s (2005) first hypothesis examined the underlying assumption of 
CMT, that the concept of emotion is scaffolded upon metaphors, such as “Good is Up”. The 
authors state that if this assumption is correct, the way in which individuals encode and represent 
information about emotionally driven stimuli should be influenced by the “metaphor-consistent 
physical aspects of the stimuli” (Meier & Robinson, 2005, p. 241). Hence, individuals should 
process positive stimuli faster if they are presented at the top rather than the bottom of the visual 
field. Meier and Robinson (2004) conducted a study where they presented undergraduate students 
with 100 positive and negative words (e.g. kiss, pretty, obnoxious and poison). The vertical 
position of the word was manipulated, such that the word was displayed either at the top or the 
bottom of the computer screen. Participants were asked to decide whether the word was positive 
or negative by pressing a designated key on a keyboard. The results showed that participants’ 
were faster to categorise positive words when they were displayed at the top of the screen, and 
negative words when they were displayed at the bottom of the screen. The results from this study 
support Meier and Robinson’s (2005) first hypothesis of consistency, that stimuli will have a 
processing advantage if they are presented congruently with the physical properties of the 
conceptual metaphor.  
The second hypothesis proposed that if emotion-linked concepts are represented by 
conceptual metaphors, then activation of the target domain should influence the activation of the 
source domain (sensorimotor information) congruently. For example, the evaluation of negative 
stimuli should activate stored “downwards” sensorimotor information, which should in turn shift 
attention downwards. Meier and Robinson’s (2004) second experiment used the same positive 
and negative words, but displayed the words centrally as opposed to shifting their displayed 
position up or down.  Participants were asked to assess the word’s valence vocally, and once 
doing so a target letter (a p or a q) appeared at the top or bottom of the screen. Participants were 
then asked to respond to the target by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard. Results 
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showed that target letter judgments occurred faster when presented at the top of the screen if the 
word had been judged positive, rather than negative. Conversely, target letter discrimination 
when presented at the bottom of the screen occurred faster when the previous word had been 
judged negative rather than positive. This experiment supported the second hypothesis that 
making a valence evaluation shifts spatial attention in a metaphor-consistent way.        
Meier and Robinson’s (2005) third and final hypothesis questioned the automaticity of 
metaphoric mapping. The authors postulated that if conceptual metaphors were required for 
understanding abstract concepts, then congruent conceptual metaphor source-target domain 
mappings should occur automatically. In other words, if an individual views a positive word, 
their attention should automatically (after a very short delay) be shifted upwards, regardless of 
whether they have consciously judged the word’s valence.  This hypothesis had not been 
investigated in relation to the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” metaphor, yet it has been supported in 
regards to the metaphors “Bright is Up, Dark is Down” (Meier et al., 2007) and “Powerful is Up, 
Powerless is Down” (Zanolie et al., 2012).  
Meier et al., (2007) tested the automaticity of the relevant metaphoric mapping by 
placing positive and negative words in the centre of a computer screen, followed by a 
categorization task. This task involved the presentation of a light or dark box, in which 
participants had to categorise the box in relation to its brightness. Unlike Meier and 
Robinson’s (2004) study, participants were not asked to assess the words valence prior to the 
appearance of the shaded box, and participants were only given 400ms to respond. Results 
demonstrated that participants responded significantly faster (in less than 400 ms) to the light 
square, regardless of its position, if the preceding word had been positive (vs. negative), 
therefore supporting the hypothesis that metaphoric mapping is automatic. 
 Correspondingly, Zanolie et al., (2012) made apparent the automatic nature of 
metaphoric mapping by measuring event-related potentials (ERPs) as participants made 
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power related judgements. An ERP can be defined as a temporal signature of macroscopic 
brain electrical activity related to a sensory, motor, or cognitive event, which are recorded by 
electro-encephalography (EEG) and are used to explore brain activity  (Rivet & Souloumiac, 
2013). As seen in Meier et al., (2004) second experiment, words were centrally displayed on 
a computer screen, followed by the presentation of a target letter in either the top or bottom 
portion of the screen. The words were linked to people’s professions or social classes (e.g. 
prisoner, baby, and slave), and participants’ had to make a power related judgement before 
the target letter was displayed.  Whilst this occurred, ERPs were measured from the N1 and 
P1 components of the brain, which are said to be responsible for discriminating attention at 
target locations. As hypothesised, participants made faster judgements when the word’s 
spatial location was congruent with the perceived word’s power as well as the ERPs showing 
higher N1 amplitude for congruent spatial positions. The authors concluded that the 
presentation of power words caused the automatic activation and shift of conceptual-
metaphor congruent spatial attention.   
 The collaborative evidence from these studies strongly indicate that when individuals 
are exposed to either concrete or abstract positive stimuli, their attention is directed upwards 
in space. Conversely, when individuals are exposed to concrete or abstract negative stimuli, 
their attention is directed downwards in space. Furthermore, whilst these studies have shown 
support for the metaphoric mapping of the abstract concepts affect in relation to brightness 
and warmth, no study has yet investigated the automaticity of the metaphoric mapping for the 
conceptual metaphor “Good is Up, Bad is Down”. Nor has a study explored whether 
conceptual metaphors activate underlying abstract concepts if the displayed stimuli is an 
image rather than a word.  
 
 
ATTENTION:	  HERE,	  THERE	  AND	  EVERYWHERE	  	   16	  
	  
A Contrasting Viewpoint: The Broaden-and-Build Theory 
Whilst the conceptual metaphor theory provides one theoretical framework for how 
abstract, emotionally valanced stimuli can automatically shift the distribution of attention; the 
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001) offers an alternate explanation. In brief, the 
broaden-and-build model suggests that when individuals are experiencing positive emotions 
their attention is broadened, whereas when experiencing negative emotions their attention is 
narrowed. In light of this preliminary explanation, this thesis must provide a detailed 
explanation of emotion before a thorough understanding of the broaden-and-build model can 
be gained.  
Emotion 
Emotion is a concept that regularly appears in everyday language, with children as 
young as two being able to articulate common feelings such as happiness, sadness and anger 
(Andrews, Viglicco & Vinson, 2009). However, whilst individuals are able to fluently use 
emotion labels in daily discussion, this is different from fundamentally understanding the 
concept of ‘emotion’.  The literature does not offer one succinct definition of emotion, as this 
concept has attracted researchers from a wide range of disciplines. This includes, but is not 
limited to, philosophy (Solomon, 2010), evolutionary psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 
2008), cognitive psychology (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006), social sciences, 
biology and neuroscience (Sotgiu, 2007). For the purpose of this thesis, emotion will be 
addressed from a cognitive psychology viewpoint.    
Cognitive psychologists, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005), describe emotions to be 
momentary, complex experiences that create shifts in people’s cognitions, behaviours and 
physiological responses. These chain reactions to cognitive and physiological systems are 
said to have been shaped over time by natural selection, allowing individuals to appropriately 
respond to a wide range of ancestrally recurrent situations (e.g. approach a kind person or 
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avoid a threat). A breadth of research indicates that these chain responses are able to 
influence higher cognitive processes, specifically the distribution of attention (Anderson, 
2005; Gray, 2004; Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 1996; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 
2007).  Attention is considered a higher-order cognitive process that allows individuals to 
select a subset of information in their surrounding environment, and to grant that information 
priority for processing (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006). The distribution of attention 
therefore refers to the allocation of attentional recourses to a certain spatial location where 
such information is gathered (McLaughlin, Borrie, & Murtha, 2010) It is this interaction 
between emotional states and attention distribution that is the focus of this thesis.  
The interaction of emotional states and attention distribution: A focus on the negative 
 The effect of negative emotional states on individuals’ attention processes has notably 
gathered greater scientific attention than that of positive emotional states.  As a result of this 
unilateral focus, there is a substantial pool of empirical evidence suggesting that negative 
emotional states cause a narrowing of attention (Schmitz, De Rosa, & Anderson, 2009). 
Hence, when an individual is experiencing a negative emotional state, a restricted subset of 
information is prioritised for processing, with extra environmental information being 
overlooked. Proverbially, this can be commonly referred to as “not seeing the wood from the 
trees” or “tunnel vision”.  
 Cognitive psychologists propose that this bias towards studying negative emotional 
states, and their consequential attention narrowing, has occurred for two reasons. Firstly, 
Fredrickson (2004) asserts that this is due to the association between negative emotional 
states and psychological dysfunction, and therefore people’s safety and well being. For 
example, sustained and extreme negative emotional states have been linked to a varying array 
of psychological disorders, such as depression, eating disorders and anxiety. In contrast, 
whilst intense positive emotions have been connected to psychological disorders such as 
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mania and addictions, these are considered “less problematic” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 
2000).   
Secondly, Fredrickson (2004) emphasizes that negative emotional states have been 
the focus of empirical research as they are thought to be inherently linked with specific-action 
tendencies (Frijda, 1986). Emotion-induced specific-action tendencies are a fusion of mind 
and body; causing individuals to behaviourally react in an evolutionary adaptive manner (e.g. 
flee when feeling fear and attack when angry). These physiological reactions, induced by the 
experience of negative emotional states and narrowed attention, can be linked to the actions 
employed by our ancestors to increase the rate of survival in life-and-death situations 
(Garland et al., 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). In other words, Fredrickson (2004) asserts 
that the actual interconnection between negative emotional states, narrowing attention, and 
evolutionary survival mechanisms has not only drawn researcher’s attention, but has further 
provided an opportunity to gather information on how humans react in life threatening 
situations. 
The Broaden-and-Build Theory: A focus on the positive  
Nonetheless, whilst the majority of research in this area has overlooked the effects of 
positive emotional states, Fredrickson’s (2004) broaden-and-build model has been 
instrumental in examining their influence on attention distribution. The broaden-and-build 
theory asserts that positive emotional states, such as happiness, excitement, joy and love, 
provisionally expand an individual’s cognition and attention (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006). 
Specifically, they are said to broaden a person’s thought-action repertoire1, providing the 
opportunity to explore a wider range of thoughts and actions. Accordingly, this can result in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  A	  “thought-­‐action	  repertoire”	  is	  a	  term	  coined	  by	  Fredrickson	  (1998),	  which	  is	  used	  to	  capture	  the	  range	  of	  cognitive	  and	  physiological	  changes	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  experiencing	  an	  emotion.	  When	  an	  individual	  experiences	  a	  negative	  emotional	  state,	  they	  narrow	  their	  thought	  action	  repertoire,	  drawing	  on	  specific-­‐action	  tendencies.	  When	  an	  individual	  is	  in	  a	  positive	  emotional	  state,	  they	  broaden	  their	  thought-­‐action	  repertoires,	  allowing	  them	  to	  broaden	  their	  interest	  and	  attention	  in	  their	  surroundings.	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flexible and creative thinking, an increase in one’s attention to their surroundings, and 
motivation to be playful and explorative (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005).  
Additionally, this theory ascertains that broadened thought-action repertoires have 
long-term adaptive advantages, allowing people to create durable personal resources. These 
resources can include physical resources (e.g. good health), social resources (e.g. making 
friends and belonging to social networks), intellectual resources (e.g. executive functioning, 
linear thinking and theory of mind) and psychological resources (e.g. optimism and 
resilience). Fredrickson & Branigan (2005) state that these resources improve an individual’s 
coping skills and ability to survive in future situations where they may face unpleasant 
circumstances and/or negative emotional states. Thus, the authors therefore suggest that 
positive emotional states are also evolutionary adaptations that enabled our ancestors to 
survive. 
Evidence supporting the broaden-and-build theory 
Over the past fifteen years, evidence supporting the broaden-and-build has been 
generated from a wide theoretical base. This has included the demonstration that positive 
emotions expand people’s repertoires of sought-after actions (fredrickson & Branigan, 2005), 
creativity and flexibility (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003; Isen, 
Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985), openness to new 
situations (Kahn & Isen, 1993) and resilient personal resources (Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 
2006). In relation to this thesis however, research has also shown how the induction of 
positive emotional states increases the breadth of attention (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). 
Individuals are therefore able to flag and process a wide range of information, resulting in the 
person grasping a better global understanding of their environment. This finding has been 
supported from a variety of research paradigms, including behavioural experiments 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Rowe et al., 2007), eye-tracking (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 
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2006) and brain imaging techniques (Schmitz et al., 2009; Soto et al., 2009).  
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) investigated the effect of emotional states on 
attention by asking university students to complete a global-local visual processing task. 
Initially, participants were induced into one of five emotional states by watching a short 
video. The films either elicited amusement, contentment, neutrality, anger or anxiety. The 
authors assessed that these emotional states were accurately induced by asking participants to 
rate how much they felt of each of the following nine emotions: amusement, anger, anxiety, 
contentment, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and serenity. Participants then completed a 
behavioural task, which was labelled a “Similarity Judgement Task” (Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005, pp. 320).  
Figure 1. Example of global-local items used in Fredrickson and Branigan (2005).  
Participants were asked to look at two comparison figures, and judge which figure 
was more similar to a standard figure (see Figure 1; the standard figure is presented on top of 
the two comparison figures). The independent variable was based on the participants’ 
selection; whether they selected the comparison figure based on global or local 
characteristics. The global figure represented the overall shape of the object, whereas the 
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local figure represented the individual smaller shapes within the global figure.  For example, 
if presented with Figure 1a, participants that chose a global comparison figure would have 
selected the left hand side figure. This figure’s global representation is that of a triangle, as 
seen in the standard figure presented above. It does not matter that the individual shapes in 
the standard figure were squares, whereas in the comparison figure they were triangles. If a 
participant had chosen a comparison figure based on those individual shapes that comprise 
the global figure, they would have made a local comparison figure selection. As 
hypothesised, participants who were manipulated into a positive emotional state displayed a 
broader attentional scope than those in a neutral or negative emotional state, choosing global 
rather than local comparison figures. 
Similarly, Rowe, Hirsch and Anderson (2006) used a behavioural experiment to show 
support for the broaden-and-build theory. This study utilised a flanker task, which required 
participants to selectively attend and identify a central target whilst ignoring extraneous 
flanking distractors.  The flankers were either compatible or incompatible with the central 
target. Participants were induced into either positive or negative emotional states by listening 
to valenced pieces of music. The researchers hypothesised that induction of a positive 
emotional state would broaden the participant’s attention, diminishing their ability to 
selectively attend simply to the central target because they are distracted by the flankers. The 
results confirmed this hypothesis, with participants induced into a positive emotional state 
taking significantly longer than those in a negative emotional state to respond to a central 
target when incompatible flanking distractors were displayed. Thus, this study supports the 
notion that positive emotional states broaden people’s attentional scope, allowing for greater 
peripheral information to be flagged and processed.  
Walldinger and Isaacowitz (2006) provided evidence in support of the broaden-and-
build theory using eye-tracking technology. Half of the participants, university students, were 
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induced into a positive emotional state by receiving a small bag of chocolates, which research 
has proven to be an effective way of producing positive affect(Carnevale & Isen, 1986; 
Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997; Isen et al., 1987). Asking participants’ to rate their mood on a 
likert scale before testing began assessed the validity of the mood induction. Participants then 
watched a slide show, with each slide containing three correspondingly valenced images, 
displayed in varying screen positions. Attentional breadth was measured by determining the 
participant’s percentage of viewing time to peripheral images in addition to the number of 
visual saccades made per slide. As hypothesised, participants induced into a positive mood 
spent a higher percentage of their time viewing peripherally located images and made more 
visual saccades than those in a neutral or negative emotional state. This is consistent with 
broaden-and-build notion that positive emotional states broaden individuals’ selective 
attention comparative to negative  
 With advancements in technological research in the cognitive psychology domain, 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has also been used to investigate 
Fredrickson’s (2004) broaden and build theory. Schmitz et al., (2009) used fMRI to 
determine the level of activation in the parahippocampal place area (PPA), which is an area 
of the brain that processes visual place information (Bear, Connor & Paradiso, 2007). The 
participants were induced into multiple emotional states by viewing valenced images in a 
slide show (positive, negative and neutral). Interwoven between the images was a 
visuospatial task, which involved the participant selectively focussing their attention on a 
neutral face that was presented in the foveal centre, whilst ignoring a photo of a house that 
was presented in the peripheral surround. By focussing on the PPA, the fMRI could then 
measure the level of peripheral information processed when the participant performed this 
task. As hypothesised, the data confirmed that inducing emotional states can affect attention 
and therefore visual processing and cortical responses. Participants induced into a positive 
ATTENTION:	  HERE,	  THERE	  AND	  EVERYWHERE	  	   23	  
	  
emotional state processed a higher percentage of peripheral information than those in a 
negative emotional state, indicating that positive emotional states increase and negative states 
decrease attention distribution. 
Soto et al., (2009) also investigated the role of emotional states on attention 
distribution and visual encoding by using fMRI to analyse medical patients with visual 
neglect. The participants were induced into an emotional state by listening to either preferred 
or disliked music, and then performed a visual task in this condition. The participants in the 
neutral condition performed the task in silence. Results showed that the patients who were 
induced into a positive emotional state showed enhanced visual awareness in their neglected 
field of view than those in a negative emotional state. The researchers concluded that positive 
emotional states increase visual processing by broadening the individuals attentional scope, 
also supporting Fredrickson’s (2004) broaden-and-build theory. 
This array of research, utilising both cognitive and neuropsychological techniques, 
highlights that individuals’ attention can be broadened and narrowed when induced into 
positive and negative mood states respectively. Whilst these studies have utilised music, short 
films and candy to induce emotional states, no study has yet investigated whether the 
presentation of valenced images can also manipulate emotional states, and consequently shift 
the distribution of attention.  This thesis will aim to design experiments that can tease out 
whether the conceptual metaphor theory or the broaden-and-build theory better explains the 
connection between emotional states and sub sequential attention distribution.  
Valence and Arousal 
As seen in prior research, this thesis will employ the use of evaluative appraisals to 
assess the relationship between emotional stimuli and attention distribution. However, before 
the methodology for this study can be designed, the relationship between valence and arousal 
must be explored. Valence and arousal have been categorised as the two predominant 
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dimensions underlying emotion (Russell, 2003; Stanger, Kavussanu, Willoughby, & Ring, 
2012), and are regularly used in the evaluative appraisal of emotional stimuli (Cunningham & 
Zelazo, 2007). Valence refers to how pleasant a stimulus is, and ranges from positive to 
negative (Ford, Addis, & Giovanello, 2012). For example, a smiling face is generally 
associated with a positive valence (pleasant) whereas a frowning face is associated with a 
negative valence (unpleasant). Arousal refers to how intense the stimulus is, and ranges from 
calm to exciting (Eder & Rothermund, 2010). For example, an exploding bomb would 
generally be associated with high arousal (intense) and a waterfall would be associated with 
low arousal (calm).  
Certain investigations in this domain, as highlighted earlier, have evaluated emotional 
stimuli on the dimension of valence, whilst overlooking the contribution of arousal. This 
approach is consistent with theories that specified valence and arousal as orthogonal 
constructs, processed in parallel and independently influencing higher-order cognitive 
processes such as attention (Robinson, 1998; Russell & Barrett, 1999). These early studies 
proclaimed that threatening (negative) stimuli attract and maintain attention longer than 
positive stimuli; (Fox, Griggs, & Mouchlianitis, 2007; Lang, Davis, & Ohman, 2000) that 
emotionally relevant stimuli are processed with greater efficiency than neutral stimuli 
(Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997) and that negative words cause greater interference in 
Stroop tasks than positive and neutral words (McGlynn, Wheeler, Wilamowska, & Katz, 
2008). In contrast, separate research declared that it is the intensity of stimuli that determines 
the urgency of attention allocation, with highly arousing stimuli ‘grabbing’ attention faster 
than less arousing stimuli (Schimmack, 2005). Öhamn (2007, pp. 167) supports this theory by 
stating that “abrupt, high intensity stimulation has been associated with danger throughout 
evolution, and therefore the sensory systems have tuned immediately and automatically to 
respond to such stimulus”. Further studies stressed the automaticity of this process via the use 
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of skin-conductance measurements (Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003) and  attentional 
blink responses (Anderson, 2005). 
However, closer examination of the methodologies utilised in these experiments 
suggests that valence and arousal might have been confounded, thus putting the validity of 
these studies into question. For example, emotional stimuli often coupled negative valence 
and high arousal (e.g. image of snakes) and positive valence and low arousal (e.g. image of 
kittens). Therefore, whilst these initial theories recognised the significance of both valence 
and arousal underlying emotional information, there is little coherence regarding the 
contribution of both dimensions in the detection and appraisal of emotional stimuli.  
Valence and Arousal: An Interaction 
Currently, there is an increasing pool of empirical evidence which suggests that 
valence and arousal are related, producing a combined effect on higher order processes such 
as the distribution of attention and evaluative processing (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & 
Tellegen, 1999). Theory suggests that the integration of these dimensions is connected to an 
innate orienting response that is associated with the human fear system (Robinson, Storbeck, 
Meier, & Kirkeby, 2004) with individuals approaching familiar stimuli and more avoidant of 
threatening stimuli. In accordance with this view, Neumann, Forster and Strack (2003) and 
Zajonc (2001) argue that both negative and intense/novel stimuli (low valence/high arousal) 
induce an avoidance response, whereas positive and mild/familiar stimuli (high valence/low 
arousal) trigger an approach response.    
Distinct combinations of these two dimensions have varying influences on the 
orienting response and the automaticity of conscious evaluative appraisals (Eder & 
Rothermund, 2010). Congruent stimuli (negative/high arousal and positive /low arousal) both 
trigger the equivalent orienting response, and therefore should be evaluated quickly at a 
conscious level. For example, individuals appear to be able to quickly determine that an 
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intruder (negative and highly arousing) is a potential threat and should be avoided, whereas a 
plate of cookies (positive with a low arousal level) brings pleasure and should be approached. 
On the other hand, stimuli that contain a combination of valence and arousal levels may result 
in the confliction of avoidance and approach responses, thus leading to delayed evaluative 
appraisals. For example, for some an image of naked man may be both highly arousing and 
positive, which may cause an individual to take time to evaluate whether the stimuli should 
be approached or avoided. Contextual information may therefore need to be considered 
before an evaluative appraisal is made (Robinson et al., 2004). 
The hypothesis that evaluative appraisals are fastest when an emotional stimulus is 
congruent in valence and arousal (high arousal/negative and low arousal/positive), and slower 
when incongruent (high arousal/positive and low arousal/negative) has been tested across 
multiple research paradigms. Purkis, Lipp, Edwards, and Barnes (2009) directly tested this 
interaction by asking participants to make valence and arousal evaluative appraisals for a 
series of images and words. The stimuli were categorically separated into four clusters; high 
arousal/high valence (e.g. Fireworks), high arousal/low valence (e.g. Assault), low 
arousal/high valence (e.g. Angel) and low arousal/low valence (e.g. Gloom). Participants 
were instructed to make evaluative appraisals of the stimulus’ ‘pleasantness’ as accurately 
and quickly as possible by pressing one of two designated keys on a keyboard. As expected, 
valence judgements occurred significantly faster and more accurately for high arousal/low 
valence images and low arousal/high valence images. This effect was significantly stronger 
when the stimuli were images rather than words. 
In contrast, Eder and Rothermund (2010) and Robinson et al. (2004) investigated the 
interaction of valence and arousal studies using indirect measures. In other words, 
participants completed a primary task whilst valence and arousal measurements were 
collected without the participants’ knowledge. Eder and Rothermond (2010) asked 
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participants to complete an evaluation task interwoven with an affective Simon task that 
discursively examined affective evaluations. As seen in previous research (Purkis et al., 
2009), this study presented images to participants that had been categorically split into four 
groups based on their valence and arousal properties.  Within the evaluation task, a white 
border encased the displayed images, and participants were instructed to respond with a 
vocalisation of the image’s valence (e.g. positive or negative). In the affective Simon task, the 
images were encased by either a blue or green border, and participants’ were instructed to 
respond with pronunciations of “positive” and “negative” respectively. Thus, in the 
evaluation task the image’s valence was relevant whereas in the affective Simon task the 
image’s valence was irrelevant, consequently providing an indirect measure of evaluative 
appraisals.  In both conditions, as hypothesised, participants were faster to respond when the 
image’s valence and arousal were paired as high valence/low arousal and low valence/high 
arousal rather than low valence/low arousal and high valence/high arousal.  
Similarly, Robinson et al. (2004) indirectly measured the evaluative appraisals of 
valence and arousal whilst asking participants to complete a series of alternate tasks. In all 
seven studies, participants were presented with emotional images that varied in valence and 
arousal, and were asked to make evaluative appraisals based on the images’ valence. As seen 
in Eder and Rothermond (2010) and Purkis et al. (2009), the images were categorically 
separated into four clusters. Evaluative appraisals were measured via participants’ response 
times to appraise and categorise the image as “positive” or “negative”; response latencies 
linked to participants’ emotional reactions to the images (participants were asked to judge 
whether the image evoked a “good” or “bad” feeling within them by pressing a designated 
key on a keyboard) and by the incidental effects that making evaluative judgements had on 
motor tasks (e.g. how quickly a participant could raise their finger from a button or complete 
a dot probe task which required participants’ to decide if one or two dots were presented). 
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Across all seven studies a consistent interaction was observed that task performance 
increased when the presented image was congruent in valence and arousal.   
Hence, studies utilising both direct and indirect evaluative appraisals of emotional 
stimuli concluded that individuals are faster to attend and respond to emotional images that 
are congruent in valence and arousal than those that are incongruent. As such, these studies 
support the theoretical viewpoint that valence and arousal are interconnected properties that 
produce a combined effect on higher order processes such as attention (see Watson et al., 
1999). 
The Current Study 
No study has yet investigated the effect of valenced images on the distribution of 
attention. Whilst valenced words have been used to support the conceptual metaphor theory 
as well as the broaden-and-build theory, it is not known whether valenced images will 
produce similar effects. This study aims to examine this, with the central question being 
whether the conceptual metaphor theory or the broaden-and-build theory is supported. 
Experiment 1 was conducted to determine whether valenced images had a processing 
advantage if they were presented congruently with the physical properties of the “Good is 
Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor. Experiment 2 was conducted to assess whether the 
presentation of valenced images (the target domain) influenced the activation of the source 
domain (vertical distance) and consequently shifted vertical attention automatically and in 
accordance with the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor; or whether the 
presentation of valenced images automatically distributed attention globally or narrowly as 
suggested by the broaden-and-build theory. In both studies, responses were made by pressing 
a designated key on a computer keyboard, and reaction times were measured. It is 
hypothesised that 1) presenting valenced images congruently with the physical properties of 
the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor would provide a processing advantage, 
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meaning that high valenced images will be evaluated faster if presented in the upper visual 
field and low valenced images evaluated faster when presented in the lower visual field 2) the 
presentation of valenced images would create automatic vertical shifts in attention congruent 
with the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor.   
This thesis also aimed to investigate the influence, if any, of both valence and arousal 
of the emotional images. Emotional stimuli were separated into four clusters, based on their 
valence and arousal characteristics. As such, the four groups were defined as high valence-
high arousal, high valence-low arousal, low valence-high arousal, and low valence-low 
arousal. It was hypothesised that participants would respond fastest to images that were 
paired high valence/low arousal and low valence/high arousal rather than high valence/high 
arousal, low valence/low arousal. 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 investigated whether valenced images had a processing advantage if 
they were presented congruently with the physical properties of the “Good is Up, Bad is 
Down” conceptual metaphor. In other words, evaluative appraisals were utilised to assess 
whether high valenced images were categorised as “positive” faster when presented in the 
upper rather than lower visual field, and whether low valenced images were categorised as 
“negative” faster when presented in the lower rather than upper visual field. As this is the 
first study to examine the relationship between arousal and attention distribution, there are no 
specific hypotheses regarding this particular interaction. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 49 (34 female, 15 male; mean age 21.02 years) psychology 
undergraduate students from Victoria University of Wellington, who participated in this study 
in return for course credits.  Ethical approval for the completion of this study was granted 
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from the Victoria University Human Ethics Committee. All participants received detailed 
information regarding the study (Appendix A) and provided written consent (Appendix B) 
before the experiment began. 
Design 
This study used a within-subject design, with image valence (positive and negative), 
image arousal (low and high), and vertical position (top and bottom) as the independent 
variables. Reaction times (measured in milliseconds) for participants to identify images was 
the dependent variable. The position of each image on the screen (top or bottom) was 
randomly allocated and participants saw 200 images, with 100 randomly selected images 
displayed at the top and 100 at the bottom. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Visual Stimuli: The visual stimuli presented to the participants (Appendix C) were 
coloured photographs selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008). IAPS is a database of images, created by the Centre for Emotion 
and Attention (CSEA) at the University of Florida. All images from this database are 
standardised, emotionally evocative, and their content covers a wide range of semantic 
categories. Additionally, all images in the IAPS database have attached normative ratings, 
including average valence and arousal ratings for each picture (1-9 scales; with high numbers 
indicating high valence and arousal). Two hundred images were selected, and were equally 
split into four categories; high valence-high arousal, high valence – low arousal, low valance 
– high arousal and low valence – low arousal (Appendices C-F). The mean arousal and 
valence ratings for the four categories are as follows: High valence- high arousal (M valence 
= 7.23; M arousal = 6.00); High valence-low arousal (M valence =7.28; M arousal = 3.71); 
Low valence-high arousal (M valence= 2.25; M arousal = 6.36); Low valence-low arousal (M 
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valence = 3.36; M arousal = 4.29). Eight neutral images (Appendix G) were also chosen for 
practice trials (M valence = 4.14 and M arousal = 4.44).  
The visual stimuli were presented using a DELL PC running the psychology Software 
Tool’s E-Prime Suite version 1.1 (Schneider, Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002). The computer 
screens presenting the visual stimuli were DELL 18 inch (47cm) CRT monitors. 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival, participants were seated in front of a computer screen, and were given 
an information fact sheet to read and a consent form to sign. They were then instructed to 
read carefully through the experiment’s instructions that were displayed on the computer 
screen.  Following this, the experimenter verbally reinforced instructions, and highlighted 
that a practice session of 8 trials would precede the official test phase. Participants were told 
that a one minute rest period would occur in the middle of the experiment, allowing them to 
rest their eyes and fingers before the second half of the test phase began.  Finally, the 
experimenter stressed the importance of maintaining both speed and accuracy throughout the 
experiment.  
 Prior to the presentation of each image, a black fixation cue (+++) in Times New 
Roman, 60-point font, was presented in the centre of the screen for 300ms. Following this 
central cue, a 10 x 5 cm valenced image (positive or negative) was presented either at the top 
or bottom of the screen (2.5 cm from the top or bottom screen edge, respectively). The image 
remained on the screen until the participant evaluated the image as positive (by pressing the P 
button on the keyboard with their right index finger) or negative (by pressing the Q button on 
the keyboard with their left index finger). No feedback was given after responding, and a 
blank black screen appeared for 500ms prior to the fixation cue for the next image. The 
participants’ index fingers remained on the two respective computer keys in between the 
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presentation of each image. Once the participants completed the 8 practice trials, they began 
the official test phase. 
Results 
All participants were included in the following analyses, as no participant had more than a 
20% error rate or an incomplete data set. Response times below 300ms were deemed pre-
emptive and times above 1200ms as prolonged detection. Therefore, the response times for 
all participants were filtered so that only trials on which the response time was greater than 
300ms and less than 1200ms were used to calculate a mean reaction time for each valence, 
arousal, and position combination.  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for reaction times 
across all six dependent variable combinations.  
Table 1 
 
Mean (SD) reaction times (ms) for Experiment 1 across all valence, arousal and position 
combinations.  
   Reaction Times 
 High Arousal Low Arousal 
Valence Upper 
Position 
M (SD) 
Lower 
Position 
M (SD) 
Upper 
Position 
M (SD) 
Lower 
Position 
M (SD) 
High-Valence 737.18 (72.24) 757.13 (92.00) 757.22 (85.45) 761.03 (84.33) 
Low-Valence 759.00 (83.87) 772.75 (83.52) 745.08 (82.49) 769.42 (88.78) 
 
Reaction times 
Participant’s reaction times were analysed using a 2 (Valence: high, low) x 2 
(Arousal: high, low) x 2 (Position: up, down) repeated measures ANOVA. An alpha level of 
.05 was used for all statistical analyses. There was no significant main effect for either 
Valence, F(1, 48) = 1.42, p= 0.24 or Arousal, F(1, 48) = 0.10, p= 0.75. However there was a 
significant main effect for Position, F (1, 48) = 9.29, p= 0.00, indicating that participants 
were faster to respond to images presented in upper vertical locations regardless of the 
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valence or arousal (M = 749.62, SE = 9.58) than lower vertical locations (M= 765.08, SE = 
10.64).   
 Contrary to expectation there was no significant interaction between Valence and 
Position, F (1, 48) = 0.55, p = 0.46; indicating that participants were not faster to respond to 
high valence images in upper vertical locations (M = 747.20, SE = 10.26) than lower vertical 
positions (M = 759.08, SE = 11.73) or low valence images in lower vertical positions (M = 
771.08, SE = 11.16) than upper vertical positions (M = 752.04, SE = 10.76). Conversely, 
there was a significant interaction between Valence and Arousal, F(1, 48) = 5.66, p = 0.02; 
indicating that participants were faster to respond to high valence images that had high 
arousal levels (M = 747.16, SE = 10.79) than low arousal levels (M = 759.13, SE = 10.86) and 
low valence images that had low arousal levels (M = 757.25, SE = 11.11) than high arousal 
levels (M = 765.87, SE = 11.02). See Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Reaction times for high and low valenced images with high and low arousal levels: 
Experiment 1. 
ATTENTION:	  HERE,	  THERE	  AND	  EVERYWHERE	  	   34	  
	  
There was no significant three-way interaction between Valence, Arousal and 
Position, F (1, 48) = 1.99, p = 0.17, indicating that there was no difference in reaction times 
for high and low valenced images that had high or low arousal levels in upper and lower 
vertical positions. See Figure 3. 
Discussion 
 The results from Experiment 1 were inconsistent with the hypothesis that presenting 
valenced images congruently with the physical properties of the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” 
conceptual metaphor would provide a processing advantage. Participants did not form faster 
evaluative appraisals for high valenced images presented in the upper visual field or low 
valenced images presented in the lower visual field. However, contrary to expectation, the 
results did show that participant’s responded significantly faster to all images, regardless of 
their valence, when presented in the upper visual field than lower visual field. This result is 
contradictory to the conceptual metaphor theory, which would forecast participants 
responding faster to high valence images in the upper visual field and low valenced images in 
the lower visual field, as seen in prior research utilising valenced words (e.g. Meier and 
Robinson, 2004).  
The results also revealed a Valence-Arousal interaction, with participants making 
evaluative appraisals faster for high valence/high arousal and low valence/low arousal images 
than high valence/low arousal and low valence/high arousal images.  Whilst this result does 
support the theory that valence and arousal are underlying dimensions of emotion that 
interact to influence the automaticity of conscious evaluative appraisals (Purkis et al., 2009); 
it offers an alternate picture to that supporting the orient response (Robinson, 1998); which 
theorises that individuals approach familiar stimuli (High Valence/Low Arousal) and avoid 
threatening stimuli (Low Valence/High Arousal). If the results had supported the orient 
response, participants would have responded faster to emotional images with these specific 
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valence and arousal pairings (e.g. high valence/low arousal and low valence/high arousal) 
than the alternate combinations (e.g. low arousal/low valence and high arousal/high valence).  
As neither of the two hypotheses were supported during this first experiment, 
Experiment 2 was conducted to assess whether the broaden-and-build theory better accounts 
for shifts in attention distribution when participants are exposed to valenced images. It was 
also conducted to examine whether a similar valence-arousal interaction, as seen in 
Experiment 1, would be replicated.   
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was conducted to assess whether the presentation of emotional images, 
displayed in the centre of the visual field, automatically shifted attention vertically and in 
congruence with the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor; or whether attention 
was distributed globally or narrowly as suggested by the broaden and build theory.  If the 
conceptual metaphor theory is supported, it is hypothesised that participants’ will respond 
faster when high valenced images are followed by a target letter in the upper visual field and 
when low valenced images are followed by a target letter in the lower visual field. This is 
because the conceptual metaphor theory posits that the presentation of emotional stimuli 
should activate relevant perceptual simulations causing congruent shifts in vertical attention. 
In contrast, if the broaden-and-build theory is supported, it is hypothesised that participants’ 
will respond faster to all target letters following a high rather than low valenced image, as it 
is theorised that positive emotional states broaden whereas negative emotional states narrow 
individuals’ attention. Furthermore, this experiment aimed to explore the interaction between 
valence and arousal, and the influence this has on the evaluative appraisals of emotional 
information. As in experiment 1, there are no specific hypotheses regarding this particular 
interaction. 
 
ATTENTION:	  HERE,	  THERE	  AND	  EVERYWHERE	  	   36	  
	  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 49 (33 female, 16 male; mean age 20.02 years) psychology 
undergraduate students from Victoria University of Wellington, who participated in this study 
in return for course credit.  Ethical approval for the completion of this was granted from the 
Victoria University Human Ethics Committee, and written consent was obtained from all 
participants who were recruited for this study. 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
This experiment used a within-subject design, with image valence (positive and 
negative), image arousal (low and high), and vertical target letter position (top and bottom) as 
the independent variables. Reaction time for participants to respond to target identification 
was the dependent variable. The position of each target letter on the screen (top or bottom) 
was allocated randomly. The same 200 test images and 8 practice trial images from 
experiment 1 were used in experiment 2. The images were displayed on the same computer 
programme and screen as in experiment 1. 
In Experiment, 2 all 200 IAPS images were presented in the centre of a computer 
screen. As with experiment 1, prior to the presentation of each image, each trial began with a 
black fixation cue (+++) in Times New Roman, 60-point font, in the centre of the screen for 
300ms. Following this central cue, an image was presented in the centre of the screen for 500 
ms, followed by 300 ms blank screen, followed by a target letter (either a “p” or “q”) either at 
the top of the screen or the bottom of the screen. Participants were instructed to identify the 
target as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the corresponding P or Q key on the 
keyboard. The lettered cue remained on the screen until participants responded. No feedback 
was given after valence selection, and a blank black screen appeared for 500ms prior to the 
fixation cue for the next image. 
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Once the participants completed the 8 practice trials, they were informed that they 
were about to begin the official test phase. 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, all participants were included in the data analyses, as no 
participant had more than a 20% error rate or an incomplete data set. Reaction times below 
300ms were deemed pre-emptive and times above 1200ms as prolonged detection and were 
removed. Table 2 presents means and standard errors for response times across all six 
dependent variable combinations. 
Table 2 
Mean (SD) reaction times (ms) for Experiment 2 across all valence, arousal and cue position 
combinations.  
          Reaction Times 
 High Arousal Low Arousal 
Valence Upper Target 
Letter Position 
M (SD) 
Lower Target 
Letter Position 
M (SD) 
Upper Target 
Letter Position 
M (SD) 
Lower Target 
Letter Position 
M (SD) 
 
High-Valence 
 
 
538.70 
 (60.17) 
 
580.88  
(66.70) 
 
537.19  
(66.05) 
 
575.49  
(64.90) 
Low-Valence 544.15  
(63.75) 
591.74  
(70.17) 
541.64 
 (62.70) 
586.64  
(72.97) 
 
Reaction Times 
 As in Experiment 1, participant’s reaction times were analysed using a 2 (Valence: 
high, low) x 2 (Arousal: high, low) x 2 Target Position: up, down) repeated measures 
ANOVA. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical analyses. All three main effects 
were significant: F (1, 48) = 8.86, p = 0.05 for Valence, F (1, 48) = 4.17, p = 0.047 for 
Arousal and F (1, 48) = 49.48, p = 0.00 for Target Position. These results indicate that 
participants responded faster to targets when high valence images were displayed (M= 
558.06, SE= 8.48) than low valence images (M= 565.89, SE= 8.57), when images had low 
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arousal levels (M= 560.09, SE= 8.74) than high arousal levels (M= 563.87, SE= 8.21), and 
when the target letter was displayed in the upper visual field M= 540.42, SE= 8.53) rather 
than in the lower visual field (M= 583.54, SE= 9.38).  
 There was no significant Valence x Arousal interaction, F (1, 48) = 0.18, p = 0.89, 
Valence x Target Position interaction, F (1, 48) = 1.14, p = .29 or Arousal x Target Position 
interaction, F (1, 48) = .61, p = 0.44. Neither was there a Valence x Arousal x Target Position 
interaction, F (1, 48) = 0.05, p = 0.95, indicating that there was no difference in response 
times for images that were pleasant and unpleasant that had high or low arousal levels with 
target letters in upper or lower vertical positions. 
Discussion 
 The present experiment aimed to investigate whether the presentation of emotional 
images, displayed in the centre of the visual field, shifted vertical attention automatically and 
in congruence with the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor; or whether 
attention was distributed globally and narrowly. Results did not support the hypothesis that 
the presentation of centrally located valenced images would cause an automatic shift in 
vertical attention, as suggested by the conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
This was consistent with the findings in in Experiment 1, where participants’ did not display 
faster reaction times when valenced images were placed in congruence with the physical 
properties of the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor. It can therefore be 
understood why valenced images presented in the centre of the visual field did not cause an 
automatic shift in vertical attention in Experiment 2.  
 The major finding from this experiment was that participants responded significantly 
faster to target letters in both the upper and lower visual field when following a high valenced 
image rather than a low valenced image. This finding is consistent with Fredrickson’s (2004) 
broaden-and-build theory. It suggests that when high valenced images were presented, 
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participants’ attention was broadened, allowing them to attend and respond faster to target 
letters in both the upper and lower visual field. Conversely, when a low valenced image was 
presented, participants’ attention may have been narrowed onto the presented image, 
therefore causing a deceleration in attention distribution and subsequent reaction time. 
 Results further showed a significant main effect of arousal, with participants’ reaction 
times significantly faster following the presentation of low arousal images than high arousal 
images. Thus, as no significant Valence-Arousal interaction was observed, these results do 
not support the theory that valence and arousal are related and cause a combined effect on 
attention and subsequent evaluative appraisals (Purkis et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2004). 
However, the results do support the opposing literature, which states that valence and arousal 
are orthogonal and independently influence higher-order cognitive processes such as attention 
(Robinson, 1998; Russell & Barrett, 1999). More specifically, these results support Öhman 
(1997) and Schimmack (2005), who argued that highly arousing stimuli automatically grab 
an individual’s attention because of their evolutionary link to danger and sub sequential 
highly attuned sensory systems.   
General Discussion 
Two opposing theoretical frameworks, the conceptual metaphor theory and the broaden-and-
build theory, attempt to explain the effects of emotionally valenced stimuli on attention 
distribution. The conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) asserts that concrete 
concepts (e.g. vertical distance or brightness) are used as metaphors to scaffold mental 
representations of abstract concepts (e.g. love and power). These metaphors rely on 
sensorimotor information in order to be understood, and therefore are said to be embodied. 
For example, such metaphorical representations include “Life is a Journey” (as in “she got a 
good head start in life”), “Argument is War” (as in “he attacked all the weak points in her 
argument”) and “Time is Money” (as in “I invested a lot of time in her”). The focus of this 
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thesis was the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor, as in “that lifted my spirits” 
and “she fell into a depression”. A central prediction of the conceptual metaphor theory is 
that emotionally valenced stimuli (the target domain) should activate the physical properties 
of the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” metaphor (the source domain), and automatically shift 
vertical attention congruently. In other words, if an individual is exposed to high valenced 
stimuli, this should activate the “Good is Up” conceptual metaphor and shift the individual’s 
attention upwards.  
In contrast, the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2004) is based on evolutionary 
principles (Frijda, 1986), with negative emotions associated with specific-action tendencies 
and positive emotions associated with diffuse-action tendencies. The main prediction derived 
from this theory is that when an individual is induced into a positive emotion their attention is 
broadened, whereas when induced into a negative emotion their attention is narrowed 
(Fredrickson, 2004).  For example, when an individual is experiencing fear, this is linked to 
the specific-action tendency to escape or avoid the immediate surroundings. It makes sense 
that an individual’s attention would be narrowed on the situation, in order to gather an 
accurate and comprehensive understanding of their immediate context. In contrast, when an 
individual is experiencing joy, this is linked to the diffuse-action tendency of being contempt 
and inactive, thus allowing the individual to broaden their attention and gain a global view of 
their surroundings.  
Both the conceptual metaphor theory and the broaden-and-build theory have a large 
pool of empirical evidence supporting their distinct theoretical frameworks, which attempt to 
explicate the influence of emotional stimuli on attention distribution. Whilst methodologies 
have varied across independent studies, the majority of research has incorporated the use of 
emotionally laden words when examining these theories (e.g. Zanolie, 2012; Steic & 
Dojiman, 2007; Meier, Robinson, Crawford & Ahlvers, 2007, Rowe, Hirsch & Anderson, 
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2006; Schubert, 2005; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Zwaan &Yaxley, 2003). However, no study 
to date has investigated the integrity of these theories by presenting participants with 
emotionally laden images rather than words. Thus, the central aim of this thesis was to gather 
experimental data in support for either the conceptual metaphor theory or broaden-and-build 
theory when utilising emotionally laden images. 
 This thesis was also interested in examining the influence, if any, of both valence and 
arousal of the emotional images. No prior studies in this area have investigated the effects of 
valence and arousal on emotional stimuli, and consequently the impact of these dimensions 
on their observed results. Furthermore, when reviewing literature in this field, it is unclear 
whether valence and arousal are orthogonal dimensions which independently influence higher 
order cognitive processes, such as attention (Robinson, 1998); or whether valence and arousal 
are interconnected and have a profound combined influence on attention (Purkis et al., 2009). 
For example, empirical evidence seems to suggest that individuals are faster to attend and 
respond to emotional stimuli that have the following valence and arousal pairings: high 
valence/low arousal and low valence/high arousal compared to those that are paired high 
valence/high arousal and low valence/low arousal. 
 In order to examine both theoretical frameworks, as well as the influence of valence 
and arousal, two experiments were carried out. In the first experiment, participants viewed 
200 coloured images from IAPS (Lang et al., 2008) that were separated into four clusters: 
high valence/high arousal, high valence/low arousal, low valence/high arousal and low 
valence/low arousal. The images were displayed in either the upper or lower visual field, and 
participants’ were asked to evaluate and categorise the image as either “positive” or 
“negative”. The hypothesis that presenting valenced images congruently with the physical 
properties of the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor (e.g. placing a high 
valenced image in the upper visual field) would provide a processing advantage was not 
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supported; as no significant Valence-Position interaction was found. Neither was the 
hypothesis that participants would react faster when the visual images were paired as high 
valence/low arousal or low valence/high arousal, as no significant Vance-Arousal interaction 
was found.  
 The second study aimed to examine whether the presentation of emotionally laden 
images automatically shifted vertical attention congruent with the “good is up, bad is down” 
conceptual metaphor; or whether attention was distributed broadly and narrowly as suggested 
by the broaden-and-build theory. The same 200 visual images, as seen in experiment 1, were 
presented in the centre of a different group of participants’ visual field. The presentation of 
each image preceded the display of a target letter (“p” or “q”), which appeared in either the 
upper or lower visual field. Participants’ were instructed to identify the target as quickly as 
possible by pressing the corresponding P or Q key on their keyboard. The hypothesis that 
centrally presented valenced images would cause an automatic shift in vertical attention 
congruent with the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor was not supported (e.g. 
when a low valenced image was centrally displayed, sensorimotor properties associated with 
the metaphor would be activated, causing participants attention to shift upwards); as no 
significant Valence-Position interaction was observed. Neither was the hypothesis that 
participants would react faster when the emotionally laden visual images were paired as high 
valence/low arousal or low valence/high arousal rather than high valence/low arousal and low 
valence/high arousal.  
 The major finding from this research was that participants responded significantly 
faster to target letters in both the upper and lower visual field when following a high rather 
than low valenced image. As such, this result displays experimental support for the broaden-
and-build theory, and is consistent with prior research that exhibited positive emotional states 
expanding attention and negative emotional states narrowing attention (e.g. Fredrickson & 
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Branigan, 2005; Rowe et al., 2007; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006).  Additionally, this 
finding extends the literature by highlighting that emotionally laden images have the ability 
to broaden and narrow attention, just as words have been shown to do. This finding therefore 
provides a unique contribution to the broaden-and-build literature, and more widely to the 
field of cognitive psychology.  
The results also revealed that participants responded significantly faster to target 
letters following emotional images that had low rather than high arousal levels. As this is the 
first study that has manipulated arousal levels whilst investigating the broaden-and-build 
theory, it may suggest that low arousal levels contribute to the broadening of individuals’ 
attention and high arousal levels to the narrowing of individuals’ attention.  This result is also 
supportive of the theoretical viewpoint that valence and arousal are orthogonal dimensions 
which individually influence higher-order cognitive processing (Robinson, 1998; Russell & 
Barrett, 1999). However, this finding was not unanimous across both experiments, with 
Experiment 1 showing an inverse Valence-Arousal interaction to that hypothesised by the 
orient response (Robinson, 1998). Therefore, it is with caution that support is more 
specifically lent to Schimmack (2005) and Öhman’s (2007) theory that highly arousing 
stimuli create urgent allocations of attention as a result of evolutionary processes associated 
with fear and danger.  
 When examining possible explanations for why this thesis did not provide support for 
the conceptual metaphor theory, there appears to be two likely possibilities. Firstly, it may be 
that the conceptual metaphor theory is primarily founded on lexical metaphors and does not 
extend to, nor encompass, other manifestations such as image metaphors that have different 
properties. This idea was voiced in a research article recently published after this thesis’ 
experiments had been designed and conducted (Coëgnarts & Kravanja, 2012). The study had 
investigated both conceptual and image metaphors in film, and specifically highlighted the 
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difference between language based conceptual metaphors and image metaphors. Coëgnarts 
and Kravanja (2012) stated that image metaphors were only able to link concrete concepts 
(source domain) to other concrete concepts (target domain), instead of linking concrete 
(source domain) and abstract concepts (target domain) as seen in conceptual metaphors 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  Deignan (2007) reflected on this difference when exploring the 
image metaphor “My wife…whose waist is an hourglass”.  It was stated that this image 
metaphor differs from a conceptual metaphor because the target and source domain both refer 
to concrete concepts (a woman and hourglass respectively), which can be visually mapped on 
to each other. In contrast, when faced with a conceptual metaphor (e,g, Argument is War), an 
individual is unable to easily visualise the metaphor as a result of the abstract concept lacking 
in tangible detail.  
Moreover, Coëgnarts and Kravanja’s (2012) identified that whilst conceptual 
metaphors are grounded in an extensive network of metaphorical mappings, image metaphors 
are only linked to the singular topic that is reflected in the image. In other words, image 
metaphors are “more specific than conceptual metaphors in their extension and scope” 
(Coëgnarts and Kravanja, 2012, pp.99). Previous research (e.g. Meier and Robinson, 2004) 
has highlighted that the presentation of valenced words may be able to activate the 
sensorimotor properties linked to the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor via 
multiple pathways, as a result of their widespread network of metaphoric mappings. In 
contrast, the proposal that valenced images have only a singular connection between their 
source and target domain, may mean that they are only able to activate sensorimotor 
properties specifically linked to the singular topic displayed in the image.  
Therefore, when considering both aspects of Coëgnarts and Kravanja’s (2012) 
research, that image metaphors may be unable to represent abstract concepts and may only 
have the ability to activate singular schematic representations, it is feasible to see why the 
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presentations of valenced images in this study did not shift attention congruently with the 
“Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual metaphor.  
The second possibility for why this study did not show support for the conceptual 
metaphor theory may be that the brain takes longer to respond, and makes more error 
interpreting images than it does to words. Karima, Thierry, Yves, and Marie-Noële (2007) 
investigated the influence of semantic priming on object processing for both image and word 
stimuli that were presented in isolation. Participants were shown either an image or a word, 
and had to complete a dual decision task where they indicated if the stimuli depicted a real 
object or a French word, by pressing an allocated key on a keyboard. The results showed that 
participants had longer reaction times and made more errors for picture than word stimuli. 
Administering both experiments in this study, adjusting the image presentation time to 
perhaps 800ms, might help clarify if having slower reaction time to images rather than words 
contributed to the current results. If Karima et al., (2007) theory is correct, a longer image 
presentation time should enable adequate time to attend and process the emotional image, to 
activate the appropriate sensorimotor properties associated with the “Good is Up, Bad is 
Down” conceptual metaphor, and cause a congruent shift in attention. However, if the change 
in image presentation time did not yield a significant result, it would throw doubt on the 
possibility that image presentation time was an issue and would support Coëgnarts and 
Kravanja’s (2012) notion that image metaphors are distinctly different from conceptual 
metaphors.  
A significant limitation to the design of this study is that the results displaying support 
for the broaden-and-build theory have an alternate theoretical explanation. The data gathered 
in Experiment 2 is said to support this theory by displaying faster reaction times for target 
letters following a high rather than low valenced image, regardless of their position. 
However, it is a possibility that low valence stimuli produce a global slowing effect, resulting 
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in all low valenced stimuli generating slower reaction times than high valenced stimuli. 
Literature generated from the emotional Stroop task supports this idea by suggesting that 
negative stimuli activate the brain’s automatic threat vigilance system, causing an 
interference effect and consequently slowing all cognitive activity (Dresler, Mériau, 
Heekeren, & Meer, 2009; Larsen, Mercer, & Balota, 2006; McKenna & Sharma, 2004; Pratto 
& John, 1991). As such, being unable to identify whether the current results genuinely 
support the broaden-and-build theory is a limitation of this thesis’s design. Future replica 
studies of Experiment 2 would benefit from displaying target letters centrally in addition to 
those already displayed in the upper and lower visual field. If the broaden-and-build theory 
was indeed present, participants’ should have fastened reaction times to centrally located 
target letters following low valenced images, as their attention would be narrowed on the 
centre of the screen. Conversely, participants should display slowed reaction times to 
centrally located target letters following high valenced images. In other words, this research 
paradigm should yield results inverse to those found in the current study. However, if the 
emotional Stroop task literature is accounting for the current main effect of valence in this 
thesis, it would be expected that this future study would show slowed reaction times 
following all low valenced images, regardless of target letter position.  
A further limitation of this thesis may be that participants were not required to 
verbally evaluate the image’s valence before completing a categorisation task, as seen in 
Meier and Robinson (2004). However, if participants need to verbally evaluate stimuli in 
order for congruent shifts in vertical attention to be observed, this would negate the principle 
that such attention shifts occur automatically (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Moreover, it could 
be hypothesised that the actual motor response of verbally stating the stimuli’s valence 
created a shift in attention, rather than the evaluation of the stimuli. An adaptation of 
Experiment 2 could assess this hypothesis by investigating the influence of overt labelling on 
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the distribution of attention. As in Meier and Robinson (2004), participants could be asked to 
verbally state the image’s valence before the target letter categorisation task was presented. If 
this modification restores “Good is Up, Bad is Down” congruent shifts in attention, it would 
suggest that the conceptual metaphor theory’s prediction that the evaluation of emotional 
stimuli causes automatic shifts in attention congruent with conceptual metaphors is incorrect. 
It is unlikely that a lack of statistical power contributed to the failure to find support 
for shifts in vertical attention congruent with the “Good is Up, Bad is Down” conceptual 
metaphor. The number of participants per study appears to be more than adequate, as prior 
research has demonstrated metaphor congruent shifts with as few as 25 participants (Meier et 
al., 2007). Moreover, the number of trials delivered for each of the four image categories (50 
trials for each valence/arousal combination) is equal to that used in Meier and Robinson’s 
(2004) research.  
In conclusion, this study provides provisional experimental data demonstrating that 
the presentation of emotional images influences individual’s distribution of attention. 
Specifically, the finding that participants respond significantly faster to target letters in both 
the upper and lower visual field when following a high rather than low valenced image lends 
its support to Fredrickson’s (2004) broaden-and-build theory. Additionally, the finding that 
participants respond faster after low arousal images than high arousal images may suggest 
that arousal levels are an important factor in the broadening and narrowing of attention as 
described in the broaden-and-build theory. Moreover, this finding provides support for the 
theory that valence and arousal are orthogonal constructs which independently influence 
higher-cognitive processes such as attention. This finding is consistent with evolutionary 
theories that suggest that intense and unfamiliar stimuli produce an urgent “grabbing” of 
attention. Future replications of this study would benefit from the suggested corrections, and 
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would therefore be able to provide more accurate experimental data on the relationship 
between emotionally valenced images and attention distribution.  
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Information Sheet: research teams with data for various uses 
 
Jacqui Wall Dr John McDowall  
Masters  Student Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology  
Email: Jacqui.wall@vuw.ac.nz John.Mcdowall@vuw.ac.nz  
 Tel: 463-6423  
What is the purpose of this research? 
• This research will investigate the impact of spatial location in an attentional task. 
Who is conducting the research? 
• Jacqui Wall is a Masters’ student in the School of Psychology and is conducting this research, under 
supervision from Assoc. Prof. John McDowall. This research has been approved by the School of 
Psychology Human Ethics Committee, under delegated authority of Victoria University of Wellington’s 
Human Ethics Committee.   
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
• If you agree to participate in this study you will be shown a series of images on a computer screen (some 
may be violent or erotic) then asked to identify a target letter on the screen. You will be asked to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible to this letter by pressing the corresponding letter on the keyboard once 
you have identified it.   
• We anticipate that your total involvement will take no more than 30 minutes. 
• During the research you are free to withdraw, without any penalty, at any point before your data have been 
collected. 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
• We will keep your consent forms and data for at least five years after publication. 
• You will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or publication. The 
information you provide will be coded by number only. 
• In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your coded data may be 
shared with other competent researchers. 
• Your coded data may be used in other, related studies.  
• A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of Assoc. Prof. John McDowall.  
What happens to the information that you provide? 
• The data you provide may be used for one or more of the following purposes: 
• The overall findings may be submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific 
conferences. 
• The overall findings may form part of a PhD thesis, Masters’ thesis that will be submitted for 
assessment. 
If you would like to know the results of this study, they will be available in approximately December 2012. 
They will be posted on the 4th floor noticeboard area of the Easterfield building. If you have any further 
questions regarding this study please contact any one of us above. 
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Appendix B 
 
Statement of consent 
	  I	  have	  read	   the	   information	  about	   this	   research	  and	  any	  questions	   I	  wanted	   to	  ask	  have	  been	  answered	  to	  my	  satisfaction.	  	  I	  agree	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  research.	  I	  understand	  that	  I	  can	  withdraw	  my	  consent	  at	  any	  time,	  without	  penalty,	  prior	  to	  the	  end	  of	  my	  participation.	  	  	  Name:	   	   __________________________________	  	  	  Signature:	   __________________________________	  	  	  Date:	   	   __________________________________	  	  	  Student	  ID:	   __________________________________	  	  	  Age:	  	   	  	  	  Sex:	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Appendix C 
IAPS Images Presented in Experiments 1 and 2 
High Valence/High 
Arousal 
1710 
1722 
2045 
2071 
2209 
2216 
2300 
2347 
4006 
4220 
4490 
4599 
4607 
4608 
4611 
4626 
4652 
4660 
4680 
5260 
5450 
5470 
5480 
5621 
7230 
7620 
7270 
7330 
7405 
7451 
7460 
7499 
7502 
7508 
7650 
7660 
8001 
8030 
8034 
8041 
8163 
8185 
8190 
8200 
8210 
8300 
8370 
8470 
8492 
8501 
 
High Valence/Low 
Arousal 
1333 
1340 
1440 
1441 
1604 
1610 
1620 
1630 
1750 
2035 
2040 
2060 
2070 
2156 
2222 
2274 
2299 
2304 
2311 
2314 
2341 
2370 
2374 
2387 
2388 
2392 
2051 
2510 
2530 
2598 
2791 
5000 
5001 
5010 
5200 
5201 
5202 
5220 
5551 
5631 
5711 
5725 
5760 
5779 
5780 
5800 
5811 
5870 
5891 
7325 
Low Valence/High 
Arousal 
1050 
1202 
1300 
1304 
1930 
2059 
2345.1 
2352.2 
2688 
2691 
2703 
2730 
2800 
2811 
2891 
3000 
3001 
3015 
3019 
3053 
3100 
3103 
3170 
3195 
3213 
3500 
3501.1 
6021 
6212 
6260 
6313 
6415 
6520 
9040 
9042 
9050 
9163 
9183 
9525 
9300 
9325 
9405 
9410 
9414 
9571 
9600 
9635.1 
9902 
9921 
9940 
 
Low Valence/Low 
Arousal 
1270 
2039 
2101 
2104 
2110 
2141 
2190 
2205 
2278 
2301 
2399 
2456 
2457 
2490 
2722 
2750 
3300 
6010 
6241 
7023 
7078 
7137 
7520 
9002 
9008 
9010 
9031 
9041 
9045 
9046 
9090 
9110 
9171 
9186 
9190 
9220 
9265 
9290 
9291 
9330 
9331 
9341 
9342 
9390 
9395 
9404 
9417 
9440 
9471 
9561 
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